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I. INTRODUCTION 
The government’s sovereign power of eminent domain1 must 
continuously be critiqued to ensure that there is a proper “balance 
between the public’s need”2 and the rights of a private property 
owner.3 Just compensation, a requirement of an eminent domain 
taking, is a major factor in that balance and must be vigilantly 
enforced.4 If the government, as the condemning authority, fails to 
fully compensate the condemned-property owner for a taking, the 
owner of such property will unfairly be responsible for the burden 
of an eminent domain action that benefits the public.5 Minnesota’s 
eminent domain statute, as amended in 2006, is an attempt to 
ensure that this balance is achieved; one piece in achieving this 
balance is the minimum-compensation statute, Minnesota Statutes 
section 117.187.6 However, in creating this statute, the legislature 
failed to provide clear direction in terms of what minimum 
compensation actually requires. 
In County of Dakota v. Cameron, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
provided some clarity by interpreting the meaning of two 
undefined, but central, terms in the statute: “community” and 
“comparable property.”7 The court’s definitions of these two terms 
provide a proper balance between the competing interests of 
public taxpayers and condemned-property owners. Although the 
minimum-compensation statute was an amendment to Minnesota’s 
eminent domain statute, the legislature’s use of unclear language 
prevents the court from being able to divert from the common law 
and interpret the statute as requiring wide-sweeping changes to 
eminent domain actions in Minnesota. 
 
 1.  Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254 (1934). 
 2.  United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984) (quoting 
United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 
(1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3.  See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 
(1981) (arguing that “[a]s soon as private property has been taken . . . the 
landowner has . . . suffered a constitutional violation”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 876 
(Minn. 2010). 
 5.  John Fee, Reforming Eminent Domain, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: 
KELO IN CONTEXT 125, 133 (Dwight H. Merriam et al. eds., 2006). 
 6.  MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012). 
 7.  Cnty. of Dakota v. Cameron (Cameron III), 839 N.W.2d 700, 707–08  
(Minn. 2013). 
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This case note begins by providing a brief overview of eminent 
domain law before specifically addressing Minnesota Statutes 
section 117.187.8 The note then discusses the court’s interpretation 
of section 117.187 in Cameron.9 An analysis of the court’s 
interpretation of the two disputed terms follows, along with a 
discussion of the scope of permissible damages under the 
minimum-compensation statute.10 Finally, the note concludes that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court properly decided the case before it, 
but could have taken its analysis one step further to hold that new 
construction is not covered under Minnesota Statutes section 
117.187. The note further suggests that if the legislature intended 
more significant change to the state’s eminent domain law, it 
should reevaluate the minimum-compensation statute.11 
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW 
A. The Requirement of Just Compensation in Eminent Domain 
In the United States, private property has been taken from 
private owners for public use since the colonial era.12 However, 
compensation for the taking has not always been an essential 
requirement of a valid exercise of eminent domain.13 Fear of 
legislatures and concern for individual rights14 resulted in a few 
states incorporating a just-compensation requirement into their 
constitutions in the late 1700s.15 In 1791, the just-compensation 
requirement was brought to the federal government through its 
inclusion in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; the 
author of the Bill of Rights, James Madison, “realized the 
significance of national ratification of a compensation 
 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  See infra Part III. 
 10.  See infra Part IV. 
 11.  See infra Part V. 
 12.  Sometimes when an owner failed to develop his or her property, it was 
transferred to another person who would use the property to productively aid 
development. William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695−96 (1985). 
 13.  Treanor, supra note 12, at 695 (“Eighteenth-century colonial legislatures 
regularly took private property without compensating the owner.”). 
 14.  Id. at 706. 
 15.  See id. at 701 (arguing that Vermont’s Constitution of 1777 and 
Massachusetts’s Constitution of 1780 “required just compensation for 
governmental taking of private property”). 
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requirement.”16 Since then, courts have attempted to create a clear 
interpretation of what the language of the Fifth Amendment 
requires in terms of the scope and permissible damages of an 
eminent domain action. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that the government may 
exercise its inherent power of eminent domain,17 as long as the 
taking is for public use and the owner of the condemned property 
receives just compensation.18 The Fifth Amendment was originally 
intended only to apply to a “direct, physical taking of property by 
the federal government.”19 However, it has been interpreted to 
have a much broader reach, with clear limitations on 
compensation.20 Specifically, the public-use requirement has been 
expanded to include actions that merely have an intended purpose 
of benefitting the public.21 With such a broad interpretation, the 
just-compensation requirement sometimes becomes the only check 
on a state’s power of eminent domain.22 This check serves two 
related purposes. First, it spreads the burden of government 
action  from just one individual to society as a whole.23 Second, 
it  deters the government from excessively exercising its power of 
eminent domain by making it accountable to the taxpayers.24 
In interpreting the just-compensation requirement of eminent 
domain, the United States Supreme Court has held that just 
 
 16.  Id. at 709. James Madison was a “committed defender of property rights.” 
Id.  
 17.  Silver v. Ridgeway, 733 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 18.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”). 
 19.  Treanor, supra note 12, at 711. 
 20.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (holding that 
public use includes economic redevelopment); see also United States v. 564.54 
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (holding that just compensation does not 
include compensation for the special value of the property to the owner). 
 21.  James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent 
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (1985). 
 22.  See id. at 1278 (noting that the just-compensation requirement ensures 
that the government properly weighs the costs and benefits of a taking and, thus, 
helps prevent the government from inappropriately exercising its power of 
eminent domain).  
 23.  See Fee, supra note 5, at 132. 
 24.  See id. at 132–33 (noting that the just-compensation requirement helps 
ensure that the government’s use of eminent domain is efficient, as it is an 
indicator that the price to the public is greater than the price to compensate every 
landowner in full).  
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compensation requires the condemned-property owner to be 
compensated the “full and exact” monetary equivalent of the taken 
property.25 In Olson v. United States, the Court provided that the 
property owner is to be put “in as good a position pecuniarily as if 
his property had not been taken.”26 However, this principle has 
consistently “not been given its full and literal force,” as the Court 
has recognized the “practical difficulties in assessing the worth [of] 
individual places.”27 With these difficulties in mind, the property’s 
fair market value has been found to be the appropriate standard 
for damages under the just-compensation requirement.28 
“Fair market value” has been defined as the price a willing 
buyer would pay a willing seller.29 Under a fair-market-value 
standard, the condemned-property owner is only entitled to 
compensation that would make him or her whole and is not to be 
left in a better position than if the property had been sold to a 
private buyer.30 All costs incurred by the property owner may not be 
adequately measured31 or fully compensated,32 but the fair-market-
value standard provides an objective basis on which to determine 
compensation.33 
Although fair market value is the appropriate measure of 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment,34 the Court has held 
 
 25.  Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). 
 26.  292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
 27.  United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 506 (1979). 
 28.  United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) 
(“Fair market value has normally been accepted as a just standard.”); Olson, 292 
U.S. at 255. 
 29.  United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). 
 30.  Olson, 292 U.S. at 255; see also Miller, 317 U.S. at 375–79 (stating that fair 
market value neither compensates for the special value of the property to the 
owner arising from its special adaptability to his use, nor for the added value 
arising from the proposed project). 
 31.  Durham, supra note 21, at 1278–79. 
 32.  Fee, supra note 5, at 133 (providing that, in addition to the loss of the fair 
market value of a property, property owners also have relocation costs, 
inconvenience, loss of goodwill in a business situation, and personal detachment 
from home and community). 
 33.  See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) 
(citing Miller, 317 U.S. at 374). 
 34.  David L. Callies et al., Is Fair Market Value Just Compensation? An Underlying 
Issue Surfaced in Kelo, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 137, 
149 (Dwight H. Merriam et al. eds., 2006) (citation omitted) (stating that “even 
though property value may include attributes that are not transferable,” market 
5
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that when the fair market value of a property is not easily 
ascertainable, or would result in injustice to the condemned-
property owner, a different standard of valuation may be 
appropriate.35 Such other standards require a court to look at the 
original cost of the property or reproduction costs.36 If the 
government does not fully compensate for a taking, the burden of 
an eminent domain action will ultimately “fall selectively upon 
certain individuals.”37 On the other hand, if the condemning 
authority could not “compel sales at fair market value,” it may be 
unable to pursue “large-scale, complex” projects for the public 
good.38 Therefore, the court must always determine a 
compensation amount that “is ‘just’ both to an owner whose 
property is taken and to the public that must pay the bill.”39 
B. Eminent Domain and Just Compensation in Minnesota 
Compensation for an eminent domain action in Minnesota has 
a foundation that goes deeper than both the Minnesota and U.S. 
Constitutions, as the state’s power to take private property was 
initially limited by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.40 This early 
limitation on the state’s sovereign power of eminent domain41 was 
overridden in 1857 by the adoption of the Minnesota Constitution, 
which specifically provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be 
taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just 
compensation therefor, first paid or secured.”42 Thus, by its 
inclusion in the Minnesota Constitution, just compensation for a 
 
price is still appropriate). 
 35.  United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). 
 36.  See United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 
403 (1949). 
 37.  Fee, supra note 5, at 133. 
 38.  Thomas S. Ulen, The Public Use of Private Property: A Dual-Constraint Theory 
of Efficient Governmental Takings, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW 
OF ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 163, 171 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 
1992). 
 39.  Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. at 123. 
 40.  The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which governed part of what would 
become the state of Minnesota, provided that when “public exigencies make it 
necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person’s property . . . full 
compensation shall be made for the same.” NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787 art. II.  
 41.  State ex rel. Burnquist v. Flach, 213 Minn. 353, 356, 6 N.W.2d 805, 807 
(1942). 
 42.  MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
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taking has been found to be an absolute right of each citizen, and 
no attempt to “‘deprive the citizen of this incontestable right’” is to 
be tolerated.43 
As a constitutional provision meant to protect citizens44 and 
deter the government from senselessly exercising its power of 
eminent domain,45 Minnesota courts have liberally interpreted the 
just-compensation provision.46 In Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary 
District v. Fitzpatrick, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the 
United States Supreme Court’s direction and held that the 
property owner is entitled to the “‘full and exact equivalent’” of the 
property.47 Once again, this standard is usually determined by the 
property’s fair market value.48 However, in Minnesota, the fair 
market value is determined by considering any evidence that 
“‘would affect the price a purchaser willing but not required to buy 
the property would pay an owner willing but not required to sell 
it.’”49 The Minnesota Supreme Court has provided that just 
compensation is to include “‘all elements of value’” in the property, 
but is not to exceed a fairly determined market value.50 The court 
has further recognized three general ways of ascertaining the fair 
market value of a property: “(1) market data approach based on 
comparable sales; (2) income-capitalization approach; and (3) 
reproduction cost, less depreciation.”51 Despite the fact that the 
 
 43.  Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 876 (Minn. 2010) 
(quoting State ex rel. Ryan v. Dist. Court of Ramsey Cnty., 87 Minn. 146, 151, 91 
N.W. 300, 302 (1902)). 
 44.  Id. (“[A] constitutional provision for just compensation was ‘inserted for 
the protection of the citizen.’” (quoting Adams v. Chicago, Burlington & N. R.R. 
Co., 39 Minn. 286, 290, 39 N.W. 629, 631 (1888))); see also Humphrey v. Strom, 
493 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992) (“[T]he clear intent of Minnesota law is to fully 
compensate its citizens for losses related to property rights incurred because of 
state actions.”). 
 45.  Durham, supra note 21, at 1278. 
 46.  See generally Anda, 789 N.W.2d at 878 (adopting an exclusion approach to 
just compensation in environmental condemnation proceedings in order to 
protect property owners). 
 47.  Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 449, 277 
N.W. 394, 398–99 (1937) (quoting Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 
U.S. 312, 326 (1893)). 
 48.  Id. (citing Monongahela Nav. Co., 148 U.S. at 326). 
 49.  Anda, 789 N.W.2d at 876 (quoting Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 559). 
 50.  Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. at 449, 277 N.W. at 398–99 (quoting Olson v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).  
 51.  Cnty. of Ramsey v. Miller, 316 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Minn. 1982) (citing BEN 
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language of the Minnesota Constitution is broader than the U.S. 
Constitution,52 Minnesota courts have limited potentially 
compensable damages in the same areas as the Supreme Court.53 
C. Changes in Eminent Domain as a Result of the Court’s Holding in 
Kelo 
Both the federal and state power of eminent domain received 
great attention and revision after the Supreme Court’s 2005 
holding in Kelo v. City of New London that a commercial 
redevelopment plan unquestionably served a public purpose and 
satisfied the public-use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.54 The 
controversy around this decision centered on the Court’s ruling 
that it is constitutional to transfer an individual’s private property 
to private developers.55 By 2009, forty-three states responded to the 
widespread public outrage56 by enacting legislation to curb the 
power of eminent domain.57 Minnesota was one of these states.58 
The purpose of the Minnesota amendments can be seen as 
providing more protection to the state’s citizens. The chief author 
of the eminent domain bill stated that his goal for the bill “was [to] 
 
W. PALMER, PALMER’S MANUAL OF CONDEMNATION LAW § 40 (1961); 4 JULIUS L. 
SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.32[3] (rev. 3d ed. 1981)).  
 52.  Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 558. 
 53.  See Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Minneapolis v. 
Minneapolis Metro. Co., 273 Minn. 256, 263, 141 N.W.2d 130, 136 (1966) 
(holding that “enhancement of value resulting from the taking” is not 
compensable); see also Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 560–62 (holding “construction-related 
interferences” and “loss of visibility to the public traveling” to be evidence in 
determining damages and not separate damages). 
 54.  545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). 
 55.  Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2107 (2009). 
 56.  Id. at 2108 (“[T]he decision was greeted with widespread outrage that cut 
across partisan, ideological, racial, and gender lines.”). 
 57.  Id. at 2102. 
 58.  Amendments were made to Minnesota Statutes section 117.025 
(Definitions), section 117.027 (Condemnation for Blight Mitigation and 
Contamination Remediation), section 117.031 (Attorney Fees), section 117.0412 
(Local Government Public Hearing Requirements), section 117.184 
(Compensation for Removal of Legal Nonconforming Use), section 117.186 
(Compensation for Loss of Going Concern), section 117.187 (Minimum 
Compensation), section 117.188 (Limitations), section 117.189 (Public Service 
Corporation Exceptions), and section 117.226 (Right of First Refusal). Act of May 
19, 2006, ch. 214, 2006 Minn. Laws 195, 195–204.  
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limit the use of eminent domain for public use and eliminate the 
use of eminent domain for economic development.”59 Part of the 
eminent domain amendment that passed in 2006 was the addition 
of the minimum-compensation statute, which specifically provides 
that: 
When an owner must relocate, the amount of damages 
payable, at a minimum, must be sufficient for an owner to 
purchase a comparable property in the community and not less 
than the condemning authority’s payment or deposit 
under section 117.042, to the extent that the damages will 
not be duplicated in the compensation otherwise awarded 
to the owner of the property.60 
However, two pivotal terms within the statute, “comparable 
property” and “community,” were not defined by the legislature.61 
Additionally, prior to Cameron, the Minnesota Supreme Court had 
never interpreted these two terms in relation to section 117.187.62 
Other post-Kelo Minnesota Supreme Court decisions show that 
the court has continued to be rather lenient in its eminent domain 
holdings. In terms of the public-use requirement, in State ex rel. 
Commissioner of Transportation v. Kettleson, the court held that the 
requirement was satisfied by a private access road.63 In terms of 
compensation for damages, the appropriate standard continues to 
appear to be the fair-market-value standard. In Moorhead Economic 
Development Authority v. Anda, the court concluded that when a 
contaminated property is condemned, “just compensation will 
usually be the fair market value of the property as remediated.”64 
However, although the fair-market-value standard continues to be 
used to determine compensation, the court has held that when a 
statute specifically calls for other factors to be considered,65 
 
 59.  MINN. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, MINNESOTA JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 2006 
UPDATE, S. 84-2006, Reg. Sess., para. 90 (2006), MN S. Comm. Up., 2006 JUD 
(Westlaw). 
 60.  MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012) (emphasis added). “Whenever the 
petitioner shall require title and possession of all or part of the owner’s property,” 
the petitioner “shall pay to the owner or deposit with the court an amount equal 
to petitioner’s approved appraisal of value.” Id. § 117.042.  
 61.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 714 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part). 
 62.  Id. at 714–15. 
 63.  801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn. 2011). 
 64.  789 N.W.2d 860, 883 (Minn. 2010). 
 65.  See MINN. STAT. § 216B.47 (“[D]amages to be paid in eminent domain 
9
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meaningful consideration must be given to those statutory factors.66 
In such a case, the court reasoned that the fair-market-value 
standard continues to be significant, as the condemned-property 
owner cannot be compensated an amount “less than the full fair 
market value of his loss.”67 
III. THE CAMERON DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedure 
On July 25, 2008, the County of Dakota (“County”) exercised 
its power of eminent domain to acquire a property for a highway 
construction project.68 The condemned property, a commercial 
property located in Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota, was a property 
on which George C. Cameron owned and operated a liquor 
business.69 The condemned property consisted of approximately 
13,000 square feet of land70 and a building constructed in 188571 
that had 4444 square feet of ground level and 1600–2000 square 
feet of basement space.72 Using a sales comparison approach,73 the 
County initially offered Cameron $560,300.74 Cameron rejected this 
offer, and an administrative hearing followed where Cameron was 
 
proceedings must include the original cost of the property less depreciation, loss 
of revenue to the utility, expenses resulting from integration of facilities, and 
other appropriate factors.”). 
 66.  See City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop. Power Ass’n, 830 N.W.2d 
32, 38 (Minn. 2013) (interpreting section 216B.47). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2013). 
 69.  Id. at 703–04. 
 70.  Cnty. of Dakota v. Cameron (Cameron II), 812 N.W.2d 851, 855 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 2013). 
 71.  Id. The district court provided that the condemned property “‘exhibited 
wear, tear, and maintenance issues commensurate with its age.’” Id. at 864 
(quoting Cnty. of Dakota v. Cameron (Cameron I), No. 19-HA-CV-09-3756, 2011 
WL 7769947, at *6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011), aff’d, 812 N.W.2d 851, aff’d, 839 
N.W.2d 700. 
 72.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 703–04. 
 73.  3 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21:34 (2014) (“[S]ales of 
comparable properties in the area sold at or near the time of taking are examined 
in order to ascertain the fair market value of the subject property.”). 
 74.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 704. 
10
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awarded $655,000 in damages.75 Cameron appealed the award to 
the Dakota County District Court.76 
At an evidentiary hearing, Cameron claimed that he was 
entitled to minimum compensation under Minnesota Statutes 
section 117.187.77 Cameron argued a very narrow interpretation of 
the definitions of both “community” and “comparable property,” in 
which “community” consisted of the trade area of the business 
within a three-mile radius of the condemned property.78 According 
to Cameron, there was no “comparable property” within that 
community, so he was entitled to an award of damages “that would 
allow him to purchase land and construct a new building of 
comparable size.”79 Cameron estimated that minimum 
compensation would therefore be $2,175,000.80 
The County, on the other hand, argued that the relevant 
“community” consisted of the city of Inver Grove Heights.81 Under 
this interpretation, the County argued that a liquor store, “the 
Robert Trail property,” qualified as a “comparable property” within 
the community.82 The Robert Trail property was significantly 
smaller and located seven miles away from the condemned 
property, but the County argued that minimum compensation 
should be based on its June 2008 selling price of $505,000.83 
The district court ultimately held that “community” should be 
defined as a “‘location where a business can survive and be 
profitable.’”84 It further provided that the “comparable property” 
need neither be available for purchase nor the same size as the 
condemned property, but rather, that they should have “‘similar 
 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d 851, 855–56 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 
N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 2013). 
 81.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 704. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  The Robert Trail property was sold one month before the County 
acquired the condemned property. Id. The Robert Trail property was 3120 square 
feet including the basement, compared to the condemned property’s 6200 square 
feet including the basement. Cameron I, No. 19-HA-CV-09-3756, 2011 WL 7769947, 
at *8 n.2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011), aff’d, 812 N.W.2d 851, aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 
700. 
 84.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 707 (quoting Cameron I, 2011 WL 7769947, at 
*4). 
11
Williams: Property Law: Limited Compensation Under Minnesota's Minimum-Comp
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
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effective age, condition, quality, and parking/landscaping.’”85 The 
district court therefore agreed with the County that the Robert 
Trail property was a “comparable property” located within the 
community.86 Factoring in the size differences of the buildings, the 
district court concluded that Cameron was entitled to $997,055.84 
in damages.87 
Cameron appealed, and the district court’s decision was 
affirmed.88 In defining “comparable property,” the court of appeals 
looked to the sales-comparison approach as it is used in the 
valuation of real estate for tax purposes; under this approach, “‘due 
weight [is given] to lands which are comparable in character, 
quality, and location.’”89 The court then defined “community,” 
using the common-usage definition, as “‘[a] group of people living 
in the same locality and under the same government.’”90 The court 
provided that the district court’s definition of “community” 
improperly limited the minimum-compensation statute to 
businesses, but concluded that the district court came to the 
correct conclusion regarding the comparability of the Robert Trail 
property.91 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
conclusions, but adjusted the definitions of “community” and 
“comparable property.”92 Applying a plain meaning approach to 
the words in the statute, the majority held that “community” means 
“an identifiable locality that has a socially or governmentally 
recognized identity, or a group of such localities.”93 The court 
reasoned that this definition was consistent with the definition of 
 
 85.  Id. at 704 (quoting Cameron I, 2011 WL 7769947, at *6). 
 86.  Id. at 707–08 (citing Cameron I, 2011 WL 7769947, at *7). 
 87.  Id. at 704–05 (citing Cameron I, 2011 WL 7769947, at *8). 
 88.  Id. at 705. 
 89.  Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting MINN. 
STAT. § 273.12 (2010)), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 700. 
 90.  Id. at 860 (alteration in original) (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 383 (3d ed. 1992)). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 706–10. The court also analyzed the 
appropriate determination of attorney’s fees under Minnesota Statutes section 
117.031(a), but that aspect of the court’s opinion is not discussed in this note. Id. 
at 710–12. 
 93.  Id. at 706–07. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/11
 
2015] COUNTY OF DAKOTA V. CAMERON 311 
the term in other Minnesota statutes.94 Thus, under this definition 
of “community,” the court found that the city of Inver Grove 
Heights qualified as an appropriate community.95 
Using a technical interpretation,96 the court concluded that a 
“comparable property” is “an existing property—regardless of its 
availability for purchase—that has enough like characteristics or 
qualities to another property that the value of one can be used to 
determine the value of the other.”97 The court reasoned that a 
“functional[ly] equivalent” property was not a necessary 
requirement for minimum compensation,98 and the property need 
not be “contemporaneously available for purchase.”99 Under the 
court’s definition, the Robert Trail property qualified as a 
“comparable property within the community.”100 Therefore, the 
court affirmed Cameron’s award of damages in the amount of 
$997,055.84.101 
In a concurrence and dissent, Justice Anderson agreed with 
the court’s result but disagreed with the majority’s definition of 
“community.”102 Justice Anderson argued that the definition 
announced by the court had its own problems, as the phrase 
“socially or governmentally recognized identity” is just as hard to 
define as “community.”103 He further pointed out that the 
definition advanced by the majority could result in many situations 
that would not fit within the definition.104 As a result of potential 
 
 94.  Id. at 707. One statute, for example, defines community as “an 
identifiable local neighborhood, community, rural district, or other geographically 
well-defined area in which individuals have common interests or interact.” MINN. 
STAT. § 52.001, subdiv. 5 (2012). 
 95.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 707–08. 
 96.  Id. at 709. 
 97.  Id. at 710. 
 98.  Id. at 709 (“While functional equivalence may be relevant to the 
determination of whether a property qualifies as ‘comparable,’ it is not a necessary 
requirement.”). 
 99.  Id. (“We are not aware of any technical definition of the phrase 
‘comparable property’ that requires a property also to be contemporaneously 
available for purchase.”). 
 100.  Id. at 708. Important factors to consider in determining if a property is 
comparable include “effective age, condition, quality, and parking/landscaping,” 
as well as location and similar uses of the properties. Id. 
 101.  Id. at 712. 
 102.  Id. (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 103.  Id. at 714–15. 
 104.  Id. at 715 (providing examples such as “a very small city, with no 
13
Williams: Property Law: Limited Compensation Under Minnesota's Minimum-Comp
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
 
312 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
problems that could arise in the future, Justice Anderson argued 
that defining “community” should be left to the legislature.105 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of Minnesota 
Statutes section 117.187 provided valid definitions for the two 
disputed terms: “community” and “comparable property.” 
However, the statutory interpretation and analyses employed by the 
court in reaching those definitions was incomplete. Additionally, 
the court failed to fully answer the question of permissible damages 
under the minimum-compensation statute when there is no 
“comparable property in the community.”106  
The objective of statutory interpretation is for the court to 
determine the legislature’s intent in enacting a statute.107 When the 
statutory language has a clear meaning, “that meaning governs 
application of that statute.”108 Therefore, when the legislature’s 
intent is clear and unambiguous, with only one reasonable 
interpretation of a term, the court must use the plain meaning 
approach to statutory interpretation.109 On the other hand, when 
the legislature’s intent is ambiguous, such intent must be 
ascertained through canons of construction.110 Only after all aspects 
 
comparable properties, or the reverse, a large metropolitan area composed of 
many different ‘communities’ with vigorous disagreement about what 
‘community’ means”). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012). 
 107.  Id. § 645.16. 
 108.  Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 2007) (citing MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.16 (2006)). 
 109.  See Larson v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010) (citing Tuma v. 
Comm’r of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn. 1986)); see also MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.08(1) (2012) (“Words and phrases are construed according to rules of 
grammar and according to their common and approved usage.”). 
 110.  Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010) (citing MINN. 
STAT. § 645.16 (2008)). Matters to consider to ascertain the legislature’s intent 
include: 
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law; (2) the circumstances under 
which it was enacted; (3) the mischief to be remedied; (4) the object to 
be attained; (5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the 
same or similar subjects; (6) the consequences of a particular 
interpretation; (7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and (8) 
legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute. 
14
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surrounding the eminent domain statute are fully considered will 
the legislature’s intention be effectuated,111 and the definitions and 
conclusions reached by the court provide accurate context for 
compensation in future eminent domain cases.112 
A. Definition of “Community” in Minnesota Statutes Section 117.187 
Minnesota Statutes section 117.187 provides that, in an 
eminent domain proceeding, the property owner is entitled to 
compensation that would allow him or her to purchase a 
“comparable property in the community.”113 The definition of 
“community” in this statute is crucial in providing a framework for 
determining how broadly or narrowly this statute is to be read, and 
thus, to the scope of permissible damages under the just-
compensation requirement in Minnesota. Throughout the 
proceedings, there were a number of different interpretations of 
“community” presented; therefore, the Cameron court erred by 
simply applying the plain meaning approach in its interpretation of 
the term. Irrespective of this error, the court’s definition appears to 
be consistent with an ascertained legislative intent based on an 
analysis of the circumstances surrounding the statute’s enactment, 
prior versions of the bill, and the legislature’s definition of the 
term in other statutes. 
1. “Community” Is an Ambiguous Term Within the Statute 
A term is ambiguous when it is subject to more than one 
“reasonable interpretation.”114 In the course of the Cameron 
 
MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012). 
 111.  See State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 
(Minn. 2011) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010); In re 2010 Gubernatorial 
Election, 793 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2010)). 
 112.  See generally Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) 
(“‘Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory 
interpretation . . . .’” (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 
172–73 (1989))). 
 113.  MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012). 
 114.  State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Minn. 2011) (“‘A statute is only 
ambiguous when the language therein is subject to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.’” (quoting Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 
(Minn. 1999))). Compare Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 363 (competing interpretations 
brought into focus the ambiguity of the statute), with McLane Minn., Inc. v. 
Comm’r of Revenue, 773 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Minn. 2009) (competing 
15
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proceedings, multiple interpretations of “community” were 
presented; these definitions included: (1) a trade area of 
business,115 (2) a city,116 (3) “a location where a business can survive 
and be profitable,”117 and (4) “[a] group of people living in the 
same locality and under the same government.”118 Therefore, the 
term “community” is subject to more than one reasonable 
interpretation and is ambiguous as it appears within section 
117.187. Because “community” is an ambiguous term, the court 
should have tried to ascertain the legislature’s intent by looking 
beyond the plain meaning of the word119 and considering “the 
object to be obtained by the law, prior versions of the law, and the 
circumstances surrounding the law’s enactment.”120 
The 2006 amendments to Minnesota’s eminent domain 
statute, including section 117.187, were a legislative response to the 
United States Supreme Court’s very broad interpretation of the 
public-use requirement in Kelo.121 If the minimum-compensation 
statute is to be seen as narrowing that reach, it could be argued that 
this section should also broaden permissible compensation. 
However, this interpretation would be inaccurate, as the “measure 
 
interpretation was unreasonable based on the language of the statute, therefore 
rendering the statute unambiguous). 
 115.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 2013). Cameron testified that 
the trade area of his business was an area within three miles of the condemned 
property. Id. 
 116.  Id. The County’s expert testified that the city of Inver Grove Heights 
could qualify as the relevant community. Id. 
 117.  Cameron I, No. 19-HA-CV-09-3756, 2011 WL 7769947, at *4 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct. Feb. 23, 2011), aff’d, 812 N.W.2d 851 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 
700.  
 118.  Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d at 860 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 90), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 700. “[I]n a smaller 
municipality, the municipality may be the community. But if the property is 
located in a large metropolitan area, the community may be a neighborhood or 
geographic area within the metropolis.” Id. 
 119.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012); Staab v. Diocese of Saint Cloud, 813 
N.W.2d 68, 77 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that legislative intent should be 
examined when a statute is open to more than one reasonable interpretation); 
Leathers, 799 N.W.2d at 611 (“When a statutory provision is ambiguous, it is 
appropriate to turn to the canons of statutory construction to ascertain a statute’s 
meaning.”). 
 120.  State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn. 
2011) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010)); In re 2010 Gubernatorial Election, 793 
N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2010)). 
 121.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
16
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of compensation” was not an issue before the Supreme Court in 
Kelo—no argument was made regarding this element of an eminent 
domain action.122 In reaching its holding regarding the public-use 
requirement, the Supreme Court expressly provided that states may 
place further restrictions on the exercise of eminent domain within 
its boundaries.123 Consistent with this holding, Minnesota’s 2006 
amendments can be seen as specifically addressing the public-use 
requirement. This interpretation is supported by statements made 
by Senator Thomas Bakk, the chief author of the amendments, that 
his goal was to “stop the use of eminent domain for economic 
development purposes” with “[t]he heart of the bill [being] 
provisions defining public uses or public purposes.”124  
Therefore, the amendments should be interpreted as merely 
intending to provide greater protection to property owners whose 
property is being taken for private use.125 The scope of the 
minimum-compensation statute is not limited to such situations.126 
Consequently, the circumstances in which the minimum-
compensation statute was enacted127 do not provide any clear 
insight into how this aspect of the amendment should be 
 
 122.  Oral Argument at 50:52, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_108 (last visited Dec. 7, 
2014). Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the issue of just 
compensation was not before the Court, in oral argument, Justice Breyer phrased 
the question in terms of putting “the person in the position he would be in if he 
didn’t have to sell his house.” Id. at 49:54. And Justice Souter stated that the 
problem that “bothers a lot of us” is the problem of making the “property owner 
whole.” Id. at 50:45. 
 123.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
 124.  MINN. SENATE COMM. ON TRANSP., MINNESOTA TRANSPORTATION 
COMMITTEE 2006 UPDATE, S. 84-2006, Reg. Sess., para. 27 (2006), MN S. Comm. 
Up., 2006 TRP (Westlaw) (follow hyperlink dated “March 31, 2006”).  
 125.  See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (“We emphasize that nothing in our 
opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the 
takings power.”); Staab v. Diocese of Saint Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2012) 
(citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010)) (noting that if statutory language is 
ambiguous, “the court may look beyond the statutory language to ascertain the 
Legislature’s intent”). 
 126.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 117.012, subdiv. 2 (2012) (“Eminent domain may 
only be used for a public use or public purpose.”), with id. § 117.187 (“When an 
owner must relocate, the amount of damages payable, at a minimum, must be 
sufficient for an owner to purchase a comparable property in the community 
. . . .”). 
 127.  Id. § 645.16. 
17
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interpreted in terms of the intended scope of the definition of 
“community” for just compensation. 
A prior version of Minnesota’s eminent domain bill, on the 
other hand, provides a more accurate context in which to interpret 
the legislature’s intent with regard to section 117.187.128 The 
original version of the bill provided that minimum-compensation 
should be determined based on a “similar sized house or 
building.”129 The legislature ultimately decided to change this 
wording to “comparable property.”130 This change demonstrates a 
clear intent on the part of the legislature to broaden the scope of 
what is evaluated when considering permissible potential 
properties for valuation.131 In order to fully satisfy that intent and 
include more properties for valuation purposes, a broad 
reading of “community” would be required as well.132 
That the legislature intended a broad definition of 
“community” is further supported by the legislature’s definition of 
the term in other contexts. In Minnesota Statutes section 
256.9754,133 the legislature defined “community” as “a town, 
township, city, or targeted neighborhood within a city, or a 
consortium of towns, townships, cities, or targeted neighborhoods 
within cities.”134 Another statute, section 52.001,135 defines 
community as an “identifiable local neighborhood, community, 
 
 128.  See generally Staab, 813 N.W.2d at 77 (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010)) 
(reviewing earlier versions of a statute to determine legislative intent after 
concluding a statute was ambiguous). 
 129.  See MINN. SENATE COMM. ON TRANSP., MINNESOTA TRANSPORTATION 
COMMITTEE 2006 UPDATE, S. 84-2006, Reg. Sess., para. 33 (2006), MN S. Comm. 
Up., 2006 TRP (Westlaw) (follow hyperlink dated “March 31, 2006”); MINN. 
SENATE, MINNESOTA SENATE JOURNAL, S. 84-75, Reg. Sess. (2006), MN S. Jour., 2006 
Reg. Sess. No. 79 (Westlaw) (“Page 9, line 26, delete ‘a similar house or building of 
equivalent size.’” (emphasis omitted)). 
 130.  MINN. SENATE, MINNESOTA SENATE JOURNAL, S. 84-79, Reg. Sess. (2006), 
MN S. Jour., 2006 Reg. Sess. No. 79 (Westlaw) (“Page 10, line 31, after ‘purchase’ 
insert ‘a comparable property . . . .’” (emphasis omitted). 
 131.  See generally Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Perry, 749 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Minn. 
2008) (viewing the adoption of an amendment as evidence that the legislature 
wanted to change the law). 
 132.  See McLane Minn., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 773 N.W.2d 289, 297 
(Minn. 2009) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2008)) (looking at the entire section 
as a whole and giving “effect to all of its provisions”). 
 133.  MINN. STAT. § 256.9754 (2012). 
 134.  Id. § 256.9754, subdiv. 1(a). 
 135.  Id. § 52.001 (definitions for credit union banking).  
18
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rural district, or other geographically well-defined area in which 
individuals have common interests or interact.”136 Both of these 
definitions for community focus on physical locality, as opposed to 
a social construction, and allow for broad applicability of the 
statute.137 Therefore, based on the specific language chosen by the 
legislature in section 117.187, it can be inferred that the legislature 
intended such broadness to be applied to the definition of 
“community” in the minimum-compensation statute as well. 
2. The Court’s Definition of “Community” 
Understanding that the legislature intended a broad definition 
of “community” focused on physical locality, each proposed 
definition throughout the lower court proceedings of Cameron must 
be rendered null.138 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s majority 
definition of “community” as “an identifiable locality that has a 
socially or governmentally recognized identity, or a group of 
such   localities,”139 on the other hand, does properly provide a broad 
definition based on physical locality that extends beyond 
commercial properties. Although the majority’s definition may not 
 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Cf. id. § 144.1476 (defining “eligible rural community” as “(1) a 
Minnesota community that is located in a rural area, as defined in the federal 
Medicare regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, title 42, section 405.1041; or 
(2) a Minnesota community that has a population of less than 10,000, according to 
the United States Bureau of Statistics, and that is outside the seven-county 
metropolitan area, excluding the cities of Duluth, Mankato, Moorhead, Rochester, 
and St. Cloud”); id. § 626.91 (defining “community” as “the Lower Sioux Indian 
Community”). 
 138.  Cameron’s proposed definition is restricted to a “[three] mile trade 
area.” Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 706 (Minn. 2013). This clearly goes against the 
broad legislative intent; such a narrow definition creates a nearly unattainable 
standard for a “comparable property in the community.” MINN. STAT. § 117.187. 
The County proposed a definition that included the “city or town [of] the 
condemned property,” Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 706, but this improperly 
excludes all properties outside the city’s boundaries regardless of the property’s 
use. The district court’s definition as “a location where a business can survive and 
be profitable,” id. at 707, inappropriately limits the applicability of the statute to 
commercial property. The definition based on the “plain and ordinary meaning,” 
advanced by the Minnesota Court of Appeals as a “group of people living in the 
same locality and under the same government,” id. at 706, goes against the 
legislature’s ascertained intent to define “community” based on physical locality as 
opposed to a social construction. 
 139.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 706–07. 
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be perfect,140 the definition clarifies the intended “sense of the 
term”141 and creates a context in which the statute is to be read. A 
definition that tries to address every potential situation risks the 
possibility of becoming so long and convoluted that it becomes 
difficult to understand.142 Therefore, the definition of “community” 
advanced by the majority is an appropriate standard for application 
of Minnesota’s eminent domain statute. However, as Justice 
Anderson concluded in his concurrence and dissent, it may be 
advantageous for the legislature to reevaluate this statute to more 
clearly define what is intended by “community,” specifically in the 
context of minimum compensation.143 
B. Definition of “Comparable Property” in Minnesota Statutes Section 
117.187 
The definition of “comparable property” in section 117.187 is 
the second determinative element in evaluating the framework for 
the scope of potential damages owed to condemned-property 
owners in an eminent domain action.144 Throughout the 
proceedings, the courts presented one basic interpretation of 
“comparable property”; however, Cameron argued that there were 
two additional requirements implied in the phrase: functional 
equivalence and availability. After evaluating these requirements 
based on the language of the statute, the court correctly 
determined that the suggested requirements were unreasonable 
and that the statute was unambiguous.145 
1. “Comparable Property” Is an Unambiguous Term in the Statute 
In the course of the Cameron proceedings, “comparable 
property” was defined as being similar in regards to the property’s 
 
 140.  Id. at 715 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing 
that “socially or governmentally recognized identity” is a phrase no better defined 
than “community”). 
 141.  Jeanne Frazier Price, Wagging, Not Barking: Statutory Definitions, 60 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 999, 1014 (2013). 
 142.  See id. at 1052–53. 
 143.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 715. 
 144.  MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012). 
 145.  The court concluded that, “[w]hile functional equivalence may be 
relevant to the determination of whether a property qualifies as ‘comparable,’ it is 
not a necessary requirement.” Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 709. Further, requiring 
the property to be available would go against real-estate valuation principles. Id.  
20
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character, quality, location, and age.146 Cameron argued that the 
definition of comparable property required two additional 
elements: functional equivalence and availability.147 However, even 
with alternative interpretations, the language is only unambiguous 
when such interpretations are reasonable. The question then is 
what makes an interpretation reasonable. Insight into the answer 
can be gleaned from a Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision that 
stated, “An interpretation [of a statute] is unreasonable [when the 
interpretation] ‘directly contravenes the words of the statute, it is 
clearly contrary to legislative intent or it is without rational 
basis.’”148 Interpreting section 117.187 as requiring a comparable 
property to be both a functional equivalent and available 
for  purchase would improperly go against the plain language in the 
eminent domain statute.149 Therefore, the court correctly 
determined that the phrase “comparable property” was 
unambiguous, as there was no reasonable alternative interpretation 
of the term presented.150 
First, it would be unreasonable to conclude that “comparable 
property” requires a functionally equivalent property, as this 
interpretation would contradict the plain language of the statute. 
When engaging in statutory interpretation, phrases are to be 
interpreted in accordance with their “common and approved 
usage.”151 The plain language chosen by the legislature 
 
 146.  Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 
700. 
 147.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 708–09 (majority opinion). 
 148.  Berry v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 570 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1997) (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 539 
N.W.2d 98, 103 (Wis. 1995)). 
 149.  See generally MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012) (“When the words of a law in 
their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the 
letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the 
spirit.”). 
 150.  Id.; see also Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 829 N.W.2d 53, 57 
(Minn. 2013) (“A statute that is not reasonably susceptible to more than one 
interpretation is not ambiguous.” (citing City of Saint Paul v. Eldredge, 800 
N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011))); McLane Minn., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 773 
N.W.2d 289, 297 (Minn. 2009); Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 870 
(Minn. 2006) (“This court will not look beyond the plain language of the statute if 
the words of the statute are ‘clear and free from all ambiguity.’” (quoting 
Olmanson v. LeSueur Cnty., 693 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2005))).  
 151.  MINN. STAT. § 645.08, subdiv. 1 (“[W]ords and phrases are construed 
according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved 
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consequently establishes that functional equivalence was not 
intended in the definition of “comparable property,” as such an 
interpretation changes the plain meaning of the chosen words. A 
functionally equivalent property would require the comparable 
property to be “virtually identical.”152 However, the word 
“comparable” merely denotes “a similar piece of property.”153 
“Functional equivalent” is simply a much higher standard of 
comparability than the legislature’s language requires. Requiring 
that a comparable property be a functional equivalent would 
improperly stretch the phrase “far beyond its common meaning”154 
and add words that are not there,155 ultimately contradicting the 
language of the statute.156 Thus, there is no indication based on the 
language of the statute that the legislature intended “comparable 
property” to require more than a property with similar 
characteristics to the property at issue.157 
Second, it would also be unreasonable to interpret the statute 
as requiring the property to be available for purchase.158 Although 
the Cameron court reached the correct conclusion regarding this 
issue, its analysis was once again lacking—the court improperly 
reasoned, based purely on the technical definition of comparable 
property in the “analogous context of tax assessment of real 
property,” that a property need not be contemporaneously 
available.159 This line of reasoning alone is insufficient to support 
the court’s conclusion, as valuation for tax purposes is not used to 
determine the property’s “true or market value,”160 which is the 
 
usage . . . .”). 
 152.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “equivalent”). 
 153.  Id. at 340 (defining “comparable”). 
 154.  See generally Kirkwold Const. Co. v. M.G.A. Const., Inc., 513 N.W.2d 241, 
244 (Minn. 1994) (analyzing the importance of interpreting plain language). 
 155.  See generally Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d 
596, 600 (Minn. 2012) (“We ‘will not read into a statute a provision that the 
legislature has omitted, either purposely or inadvertently.’” (quoting Reiter v. 
Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 2006))). 
 156.  See Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 313 (Minn. 2001). 
 157.  See generally Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 
549 (1987) (“Nothing in the language or structure of [the statute] compels the 
conclusion that ‘in Alaska’ means something other than ‘in the State of Alaska.’”). 
 158.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 709 (Minn. 2013). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Valuation for Taxation Purposes as Admissible to 
Show Value for Other Purposes, 39 A.L.R.2d 209 (1955). 
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goal of valuation for an eminent domain action.161 A property’s 
value for tax purposes has, therefore, been held not to be “relevant 
to the question of that same property’s market value.”162 The same 
differences that make tax assessments irrelevant in eminent domain 
cases require an independent analysis of whether a property must 
be available in the context of eminent domain.163 
In addressing this issue, the court should have looked at the 
requirement of availability in terms of the fair-market-value 
standard.164 When evaluating a property under the fair-market-value 
standard, the determination of a property’s value does not require 
an actual purchaser willing to purchase a property.165 The fair-
market-value standard merely requires the determination of a value 
that “in all probability” would have been arrived at through 
negotiation.166 The question to satisfy this requirement is not 
whether the property is readily available, but rather, what would a 
willing purchaser pay if the property were for sale. 
In trying to ascertain the legislature’s intent, it is also 
important to consider “the consequences of a particular 
interpretation.”167 In this case, interpreting Minnesota Statutes 
section 117.187 as requiring a property to be available for purchase 
would improperly affect other provisions of the 2006 amendments 
to the eminent domain statute. For example, section 117.186 
provides for compensation for loss of going concern.168 This statute 
states: 
 
 161.  See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 
470, 474 (1973) (“The owner is entitled to the fair market value of his property at 
the time of the taking.”). 
 162.  EOP-Nicollet Mall, L.L.C. v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 723 N.W.2d 270, 283 
(Minn. 2006); see also Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 882 
(Minn. 2010) (“[I]n a tax court proceeding, the admission of contamination 
evidence does not raise the same constitutional concerns of due process and just 
compensation that it does in a condemnation proceeding.”). 
 163.  See Cont’l Retail, L.L.C. v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 801 N.W.2d 395, 402 
(Minn. 2011) (providing that, in the tax context, the sales comparison approach is 
“based on the price paid in actual market transactions of comparable properties” 
(citing Kmart Corp. v. Cnty. of Becker, 709 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Minn. 2006))). 
 164.  See infra Part IV.C (explaining that the fair-market-value standard 
continued as the valuation standard). 
 165.  See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012). 
 168.  Id. § 117.186, subdiv. 2. A going concern is the “benefit[] that accrue[s] 
to a business or trade as a result of its location, reputation for dependability, skill 
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If a business or trade is destroyed by a taking, the owner 
shall be compensated for loss of going concern, unless . . . 
the loss can be reasonably prevented by relocating the 
business or trade in the same or a similar and reasonably 
suitable location as the property that was taken . . . .169  
If section 117.187 were interpreted as requiring a property to be 
available, it would follow that a property would also need to be 
available under section 117.186, and there would never be a need 
to “compensate for loss of going concern” as the loss would always 
be preventable through business relocation. Therefore, an 
interpretation requiring property availability is thus unreasonable 
as it would improperly result in an invalidation of section 117.186. 
Another section of the statute, section 117.188, further 
provides that “[t]he condemning authority must not require the 
owner to accept as part of the compensation due any substitute or 
replacement property.”170 If the condemning authority cannot 
require the condemned-property owner to accept an available 
property, it does not make sense to interpret section 117.187 as 
requiring the condemning authority to provide such property. 171 
Interpreting section 117.187 as requiring the property to be 
available would drastically limit, hamper, and unduly complicate 
eminent domain proceedings by entangling them into a real estate 
process. The legislature simply cannot guarantee that an actual 
purchase of property will happen. The focus of the proceedings 
would switch from a monetary award to a property award.172 Based 
on the language used in the statute, there is no indication that the 
legislature intended this result. Therefore, the court correctly 
determined that there was no reasonable alternative definition, and 
“comparable property” was an unambiguous phrase within section 
117.187.173 
 
or quality, customer base, good will, or any other circumstances resulting in the 
probable retention of old or acquisition of new patronage.” Id. § 117.186, subdiv. 
1(1). 
 169.  Id. § 117.186, subdiv. 2(2). 
 170.  Id. § 117.188. 
 171.  See Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 2007) (“[E]very law 
shall be construed to give effect to all its provisions . . . .” (citing MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.16 (2006))). 
 172.  See Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 710 (Minn. 2013). 
 173.  See id. at 709. 
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2. Definition of “Comparable Property” 
As an unambiguous term, “comparable property” would be 
subject to the plain meaning approach of statutory 
interpretation,174 unless it were a technical word or phrase,175 in 
which case a definition based on the acquired technical meaning of 
the term would be required.176 Here, the phrase “comparable 
property” is neither technical nor has it acquired a special 
meaning. Therefore, the court improperly provided a technical 
definition when it should have applied the plain meaning 
approach. 
Irrespective of this error, the definition reached by the court 
provides an adequate definition for comparable property as “a 
piece of property that has enough like characteristics and qualities 
to another piece of property that the value of one can be used to 
determine the value of the other.”177 This definition is consistent 
with the dictionary definition of “comparable,” which is defined as 
“[a] piece of property used as a comparison to determine the value 
of a similar piece of property.”178 When applying this definition, 
additional factors to consider include: “land size, features, and 
location; the square footage, age, design, and construction quality 
of any structures on the land; as well as features related to the 
property’s usage.”179 
 
 174.  The legislature’s intent can be discerned from the “plain and 
unambiguous language” of the statute. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 
N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2000) and Ed 
Herman & Sons v. Russell, 535 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1995)). 
 175.  MINN. STAT. § 645.08 (2012). 
 176.  See generally Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 829 N.W.2d 53, 57 
(Minn. 2013) (citing Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 
2012)) (stating that, when technical words and phrases are involved, such 
language must be defined based on their “special meaning”). 
 177.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 708. Characteristics and qualities may include 
“location, use, physical features, economic attributes, financing terms, conditions 
of sale, market conditions, and legal characteristics such as zoning and other 
restrictions.” Id. at 708 n.2 (citing APPRAISAL INST., THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 
141 (13th ed. 2008)). 
 178.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 152, at 340. 
 179.  Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 
700. 
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C. Damages Based on Fair Market Value in Minnesota Statutes Section 
117.187 
A thorough reading of Minnesota Statutes section 117.187, in 
light of the surrounding sections, indicates that the legislature 
intended the fair-market-value standard to continue to be the 
appropriate measure of damages for eminent domain proceedings. 
The fair market value is the appropriate standard under common 
law;180 the standard would only change if there was a clear 
indication from the legislature that such change was intended.181 
Based on the language of section 117.187, there is no such 
indication here. Instead, this statutory language indicates that the 
legislature simply intended to switch the property valued under the 
fair-market-value standard from the traditional condemned 
property to the comparable property.182 
The underlying theory of compensation provides that the 
property owner must be made whole for the taking.183 When there 
is a comparable property within the community, being made whole 
under section 117.187 would be satisfied by providing the property 
owner with sufficient monetary compensation to be able to 
purchase a property similar to the one lost.184 According to the 
court, such was the case in Cameron, and compensation based on 
the sale of the Robert Trail property was an appropriate property 
on which to base damages.185 
However, had the court determined that the Robert Trail 
property was not a “comparable property within the community,” 
the court would have faced the question of whether just 
compensation under the minimum-compensation statute would 
 
 180.  United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) 
(“Fair market value has normally been accepted as a just standard.”); Olson v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
 181.  See Staab, 813 N.W.2d at 75 (providing that the legislature could have 
expressly limited the definition of “persons” if that is what it intended); Premier 
Bank v. Becker Dev., L.L.C., 785 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Minn. 2010) (reasoning that 
rules of statutory interpretation “‘forbid adding words or meaning to a statute’”) 
(quoting Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2001))). 
 182.  Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d at 861; Brief of Amicus Curiae League of 
Minnesota Cities at 13, Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700 (No. A11-1273), 2012 WL 
10020704. 
 183.  Olson, 292 U.S. at 255. 
 184.  MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012). 
 185.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 710.  
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include the costs for new construction.186 The answer to this 
question provides the final element of the scope of section 117.187. 
Absent a comparable property from which appropriate 
compensation would be determined, other valuation methods 
would need to be applied. Courts have “occasionally used the cost 
of replacement as an alternative to fair market value.”187 
Compensation based on the replacement-cost standard would 
entitle the condemned-property owner to receive compensation for 
the “cost to construct a building with an equivalent utility to the 
building being appraised, at current prices, using modern 
materials, standards, design and layout.”188 In order for the 
replacement-cost standard to apply to just-compensation damages, 
a strict standard should be met.189 This standard would require 
the  court to carefully consider the line between making the 
property owner whole and providing him or her with a windfall.190 
If the strict standard is met, the property owner may be entitled to 
compensation that covers the cost of replacement.191 However, it 
has been argued that compensation based on replacement costs 
should consider “physical ‘wear and tear’ and economic and 
functional obsolescence.”192 Therefore, it can be inferred that while 
 
 186.  See id. at 704 (arguing that “in the absence of a comparable property 
available for purchase, he was entitled to compensation that would allow him to 
purchase land and construct a new building of comparable size and quality”). 
 187.  Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 702 (2005). Replacement value is used 
when: (1) the market value is not readily available, (2) there are extremely high 
compensable consequential damages, or (3) the fair market value results in 
manifest injustice. Id. at 702–03.  
 188.  Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Cnty. of Carver, 573 N.W.2d 651, 660 
(Minn. 1998). 
 189.  See Case Comment, “Substitute Facilities” Compensation for Private 
Condemnees: United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 92 HARV. L. REV. 514, 523 
(1978). 
 190.  See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1984) 
(reasoning that “any increase in the quality of the facility may be as readily 
characterized as a ‘windfall’ as the award of cash proceeds for a substitute facility 
that is never built”); Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1493 (1999) 
(explaining that one person’s windfall is another person’s loss). 
 191.  Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 573 N.W.2d at 660. 
 192.  State by Lord v. Red Wing Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 92 N.W.2d 206, 
209 (Minn. 1958); see also Lewis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 623 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Minn. 
2001) (reasoning that appraisers “discounted the building replacement cost” in a 
valuation proceeding to account for “functional obsolescence”). 
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Minnesota Statutes section 117.187 would not fully cover the cost of 
new construction, it perhaps would permit compensation to 
remodel a property in the “community” into a comparable 
property. 
This limited interpretation of replacement-cost compensation 
is founded on the basic principles behind the fair-market-value and 
just-compensation requirements. Regardless of the valuation 
method employed, just compensation does not require the 
“condemning authority [to] pay more than the market value of the 
property.”193 In United States v. 50 Acres of Land, the United States 
Supreme Court specifically rejected compensation for a 
replacement facility, as “any increase in the quality of the facility 
may be readily characterized as a ‘windfall,’” and creating a 
formula to reduce such possibility “would enhance the risk of error 
and prejudice.”194 In a free market, a property owner would not 
receive the full amount that it would cost the buyer to purchase the 
property and build a new structure on it; the property owner would 
receive the value of the property, and the buyer would incur 
additional costs to construct the building. Providing a condemned-
property owner with full new construction compensation would 
allow the property owner to have an old building replaced with a 
brand new and more valuable building,195 paid for at the expense of 
public funds.196 In such situations, the property owner would 
receive damages that would far exceed his or her actual loss,197 
which would go against basic principles of fairness198 and the 
general understanding that the public interest199 outweighs the 
 
 193.  Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 897 (Minn. 2010) 
(Dietzen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 194.  469 U.S. at 34–36. 
 195.  See id. at 34 (arguing that “[i]f the replacement facility is more costly than 
the condemned facility, it presumably is more valuable”). 
 196. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (reasoning 
that the burden should “be spread among taxpayers through the payment of 
compensation”). 
 197.  See Kades, supra note 190, at 1559 (“Paying anything more than market 
value price would result in windfalls for those lucky enough to own property 
needed for public projects . . . .”) 
 198.  See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 
(1950). 
 199.  See generally Serkin, supra note 187, at 706–08 (“The government would 
come to a standstill if required to compensate for every harm it imposed.”). 
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private interest.200 Interpreting the amendment as fully covering the 
cost of new construction would thus produce an absurd and unjust 
result, contradicting an important principle of statutory 
interpretation.201 In the end, such unrealistically high damages 
could prevent the government from exercising its power of 
eminent domain, even when it would be in the public’s best 
interest.202 
Therefore, when there is no “comparable property within the 
community,” damages under Minnesota Statues section 117.187 
should be based on a reproduction-cost standard minus 
depreciation. In the end, valuation involves the exercise of 
judgment.203 It would not be unreasonable for such judgment to 
determine that when the situation involves a property where fair 
market value cannot be ascertained, the replacement-cost standard 
may be applied. Had the legislature intended to significantly 
modify the structure of compensation to include the cost of new 
construction, such instruction would have been clearly indicated in 
the amendment’s language.204 
D. Effect of the Cameron Decision on Eminent Domain 
Not only did the Cameron court determine damages based on a 
fair-market-value standard, but the court left unanswered the 
question of “whether the minimum-compensation statute permits 
an upward or downward adjustment from the value of the 
comparable property” to factor in differences between the 
properties.205 It can be inferred from the court’s statement 
regarding this aspect of damages that, had the damages been 
challenged by the state, the court may not have awarded such 
 
 200.  MINN. STAT. § 645.17(5) (2012). 
 201.  See Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 278 (Minn. 2000) 
(citing Erickson v. Sunset Mem’l Park Ass’n, 259 Minn. 532, 543, 108 N.W.2d 434, 
441 (1961)). 
 202.  See generally Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New 
London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, and Congressional Powers, 32 J. LEGIS. 165, 176–
77 (2006) (“A government project furthered by the use of eminent domain must 
be more valuable than the compensation due in order for the use of eminent 
domain to make economic sense.”).  
 203.  4 SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 51, § 12.01. 
 204.  See generally United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 
123 (1950) (“Fair market value has normally been accepted as a just standard.”). 
 205.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 708 n.3 (Minn. 2013).  
29
Williams: Property Law: Limited Compensation Under Minnesota's Minimum-Comp
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
 
328 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
adjustments. This element of the opinion brings to light the hard 
stance that the court is taking regarding permissible compensation 
in eminent domain proceedings. Consequently, even though there 
were changes to eminent domain law as a result of Kelo,206 the 
reality that Cameron seems to establish is that the amendments may 
actually have resulted in very minimal actual change.207 If real 
change was intended by the legislature, such change should have 
been clearly shown by: (1) stating the purpose of the statute, (2) 
describing the intended remedy, and (3) providing a clear path for 
how that remedy should be achieved. Without clear language that 
such change is intended, no real change will occur,208 as courts will 
continue to be required to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis 
“in order that there might be stability in the law.”209 If the 
legislature intends a more limited interpretation of permissible 
comparable properties or broader interpretation of compensable 
damages, it should reevaluate the statute and clearly articulate its 
intended application. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The court’s interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 
117.187 can be seen as being pro-condemning authority. The court 
provided a broad definition of both “community” and “comparable 
property,”210 permitting a greater range of permissible properties to 
be included in the determination of just compensation in an 
eminent domain action. This decision can be seen as a pushback to 
the post-Kelo public outrage. If the legislature had intended the 
minimum-compensation statute to significantly change the 
structure of just compensation under eminent domain, such intent 
would have been clearly reflected in the statute. 
 
 206.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005). 
 207.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 713 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (“But if the Legislature intended to increase compensation to 
displaced property owners, then I fear that Minn. Stat. § 117.187 fails to provide 
courts with sufficient guidance to achieve that aim.”). 
 208.  See generally State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 
165 (Minn. 2011) (“Nothing in [the statute] disturbs the long-standing principle 
of deference by the courts to the Commissioner’s legislative decision-making in 
condemning private property to build highways.”). 
 209.  Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted). 
 210.  Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 706–710. 
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Therefore, the court in Cameron ultimately established 
appropriate and valid definitions for both “comparable property” 
and “community.”211 Additionally, the court correctly held that 
Minnesota Statutes section 117.187 does not include compensation 
for replacement-cost damages in an eminent domain proceeding 
where there is a comparable property within the community.212 
However, the court could have taken its analysis one step further 
and established that, in Minnesota, eminent domain damages will 
not include new construction, even in the absence of a comparable 
property in the community. In a case where the fair-market-value 
standard cannot be applied, reduced replacement costs may 
provide appropriate compensation. 
 
 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
31
Williams: Property Law: Limited Compensation Under Minnesota's Minimum-Comp
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
